Exploring The Strategy Choice Of The Participants In The Driver Training Market Based On The Perspective Of Evolutionary Game

Abstract

    The price war causes vicious competition in the driver training industry and disrupts the market order, and the driver training market is facing the choice of entry and exit. Based on the evolutionary game model, this paper explores the best strategic choice of the three parties involved in the driver training market by constructing an evolutionary game model for the selection of strategic behavior of the regulator, driver training institutions, and students and using MATLAB simulation analysis to explore the direction of healthy, orderly and scientific development of the driver training market. The results indicate that the stronger the regulator rewards the credibility evaluation of driver training institutions that adopt healthy competition (or penalizes those that do not), the more the driver training institutions tend to choose the healthy competition. The less additional loss of training for trainees, the more likely they are to decide to enroll. The higher the benefit of benign competition (or the cost of vicious competition) for driver training institutions, the more inclined they are to choose the healthy competition.